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Incentivizing Armed Non-State Actors to Comply
with the Law: Protecting Children in Times of
Armed Conflict
ABSTRACT

Although the use of child soldiers is an international problem, it is
difficult to reconcile international law with the compliance of armed
non-state actors, or ANSAs. International law usually binds states and
seldom reaches ANSAs. Geneva Call, a non-profit group based out of
Switzerland, has written Deeds of Commitment as possible compliance
mechanisms for some international issues, including the use of children
in armed conflict. Under current international law, Deeds of
Commitment concerning child soldiers, such as the one created by Geneva
Call, carry no binding nature and represent no enforceable norm
against organized armed groups. However, they still hold significant
potential as a method by which ANSAs may commit to abide by
international norms in a way that is analogous to a unilateral
statement. The international community should find ways to encourage
compliance with these Deeds by threatening measures such as sanctions,
delegitimization, and political isolation, or by offering economic
incentives, training, law-making abilities, and a political position to
help rebuild a state. As Deeds of Commitment have proven successful so
far, it appears that attracting more ANSA signatories could broaden
their positive international effect.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“[A] child is someone who is completely dependent on his parents
to be fed, to be cared for, to be dressed and housed.” 1 Children play
outside, fight with their siblings, and tease their parents. “Children
are . . . very curious creatures.” 2 They follow what the adults do. But
they are young, they are innocent, and they are naïve. “They have no
fear and do not realize they can be affected.” 3 They mimic the ways
the adults socialize. The adults leave to get together with people from
different communities, and sometimes the children are invited to
come along. The children think that perhaps it is a sort of game played
with people from other places. But this game is different. Sometimes,
the ones who come back have changed. And sometimes, not everyone
comes back. “The…[children] can be very happy during [these
games], but then afterwards will be very sad when they realize that
they have lost friends or when they have to confront wounded
comrades. The children become very perturbed and no longer react

1. GENEVA CALL, IN THEIR WORDS: PERSPECTIVES OF ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS ON
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM THE EFFECTS OF ARMED CONFLICT 13 (2010)
[hereinafter GENEVA CALL].
2. Id.
3. Id.
THE

990

5.HAFEN.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

989

11/28/2016 5:22 PM

Incentivizing Armed Non-State Actors

like children. Their faces are often sad. They spend their time reliving
the different events in their heads.” 4 The new game is war.
The above quotations come from an official statement from the
Armée populaire pour la restauration de la République et la
démocratie (People’s Army for the Restoration of Democracy), or
APRD—a rebel group in the Central African Republic. In the same
statement, the APRD expressed that it was “disagreeably surprised” to
learn that it was on the UN’s list of movements that use children in
warfare. 5 It believes that children are never recruited, and that if
children do get involved, it is often without the knowledge of the
APRD chiefs. 6 “It is because the war was brought to us that the
children suffered the consequences,” the statement reported. 7 In the
APRD’s eyes, it is not its fault that children were fighting in its wars.
In fact, children fight in many nations. International criminal
offenses committed by children encompass “crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and genocide,” and they do not happen “by a child acting
in isolation but are offenses that occur in the course of armed
conflicts.” 8 When economies suffer, “street children appear—working
as hawkers, beggars, and child prostitutes,” because they effectively
have to make the decision to provide for themselves. 9 In areas of
armed conflict, many children choose to become soldiers in order to
survive. In some cases, armed groups may entice children to become
soldiers, and seeing no other option, the children may easily be
taken in. 10
Instances of child recruitment are not identical. 11 Although state
forces have historically been known to employ children in their armies, 12

4. Id.
5. Id. at 14.
6. Id. at 13–14.
7. Id. at 14.
8. Paola Konge, International Crimes & Child Soldiers, 16 SW. J. INT’L L. 41, 43 (2010).
9. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, Sacrificial Lambs of Globalization: Child Labor in the
Twenty-First Century, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 421, 432 (2009).
10. See Jason Hart, The Politics of “Child Soldiers,” 13 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 217, 218
(2007) (expressing concern “at the ways that the issue of child recruitment is currently being
appropriated in pursuit of aims that may have little or nothing to do with the well-being of
the young”).
11. Id.
12. UNICEF, Children as Soldiers, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 1996,
http://www.unicef.org/sowc96/2csoldrs.htm (last visited Sep. 30, 2016).
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this practice is virtually nonexistent among state actors. Instead, “the
primary crux of the child soldier problem has shifted to the recruitment
of children by nongovernmental armed groups, such as insurgents;
rebels; revolutionary movements; guerrilla fighters; global terrorist
networks; regional tribal, ethnic, and religious militants; and local
defense organizations.” 13 In other words, armed non-state actors
(ANSAs) are those primarily to blame for using child soldiers.
Although the use of child soldiers is an international problem, the
concept of requiring ANSAs to comply with international law is
difficult. ANSAs who use child soldiers are not compliant with
international law. However, international law usually binds only states
and seldom reaches ANSAs, except to the extent that it is translated
into domestic law. 14 Therefore, international laws that would prevent
states from using child soldiers and provide sanctions for noncompliance are less effective with respect to ANSAs. Nevertheless,
there are some mechanisms in place to combat this practice.
Geneva Call, a non-profit group based out of Switzerland, has
written Deeds of Commitment as possible compliance mechanisms for
some of these international issues, including the use of children in
armed conflict. 15 Deeds of Commitment are unilateral agreements that
ANSAs can sign to pledge their compliance with international norms.
Under current international law, Deeds of Commitment concerning
child soldiers, such as the one created by Geneva Call, 16 are nonbinding and represent no enforceable norm against organized armed
groups, particularly armed non-state actors. Geneva Call itself notes
that “[t]here is no denying the challenges” 17 of the situation.18
However, Geneva Call’s Deeds of Commitment give ANSAs the
opportunity to unilaterally agree to humanitarian provisions. 19
Further, the rising number of signatories indicates a willingness on the
13. David M. Rosen, The Dilemma of Child Soldiers: How should international law treat
children engaged in armed conflicts?, 10 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 6, 7 (2010).
14. See, e.g., International Laws and Child Rights, CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L,
https://www.child-soldiers.org/international-laws-and-child-rights (last visited Sep. 30, 2016).
15. GENEVA CALL, Deed of Commitment, http://genevacall.org/how-we-work/deedof-commitment/ (last visited Sep. 30, 2016).
16. This Deed of Commitment regarding the use of child soldiers is called the “Deed of
Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict.” Id.
17. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 7.
18. Id.
19. GENEVA CALL, Deed of Commitment, supra note 15.
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part of ANSAs to explore possible solutions. 20 Deeds of Commitment
are useful as alternative mechanisms because they are voluntary. 21 Even
though they are non-binding, they have proven to be effective. 22 It is
possible to build upon and expand those successes by furthering the
reach of these Deeds and by making them more effective and attractive
to ANSA groups.
The international community should find ways to encourage
compliance with Deeds of Commitment to protect children from the
effects of armed conflict. To accomplish this objective, the
international community could incentivize the signing of and
compliance with Deeds of Commitment by threatening measures such
as sanctions, delegitimization, and political isolation, or by offering
economic incentives, training, law-making abilities, and a seat at the
table in efforts to rebuild and govern war-torn states.
This Article will first explicate the problem concerning child
soldiers. Part II introduces child soldiers, who are more effective as
fighters than might be anticipated and often voluntarily involved in
armed conflict. Next, it will address the current international law on
child soldiers. Part III will explain that ANSAs are the primary users
of child soldiers, and that they are not traditionally subject to
international law. Part IV introduces non-governmental
organizations, or NGOs, and their place with regard to those
international laws. This Article will highlight Geneva Call as an NGO,
and will place specific emphasis on its unique Deeds of Commitment,
which will be explained in Part V, and how ANSAs can voluntarily
commit to and sign these Deeds. Part VI will discuss engagement and
compliance. As Geneva Call’s Deeds have proven successful so far, it
appears that the positive international effect of the Deed of
Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of
Armed Conflict in particular could be broadened by attracting more
ANSA signatories through enforcement and incentives, or rather,
sticks and carrots. Part VII concludes.

20. See GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, http://genevacall.org/who-weare/faqs/#faq (last visited Sep. 30, 2016) (indicating that the expansion of Geneva Call’s
thematic areas to include the protection of children in armed conflict “has been encouraged by
ANSAs themselves”).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., id.
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II. BACKGROUND
The increase in and magnitude of the use of children in armed
conflict are regarded as some of the “[m]ost horrifying of . . . human
rights violations.” 23 Children have been utilized by state and non-state
groups as soldiers, and “[d]espite . . . international laws, it has proven
to be difficult to suppress the recruitment of children into armed
groups.” 24 Although virtually all states no longer use child soldiers,
hundreds of thousands of children are still participating in armed
conflict through ANSAs. 25 Because international law is not binding on
them, one of the biggest hurdles in overcoming this problem is
effectively engaging and incentivizing ANSAs regarding their
compliance with international norms.
A. Child Soldiering is a Problem
The use of child soldiers has historical roots. In fact, “historical
studies show that the armies of the West were filled with ‘boy soldiers’
from at least the Middle Ages through World War I. Their ‘nobility’
and ‘sacrifice’ in battle were often publicly celebrated.” 26 Until the
mid-1900s, “many national armies recruited children.” 27 Even though
the practice among state actors is all but extinct 28 (with the exception
of “Myanmar (Burma), which makes extensive use of child soldiers to
meet recruitment goals” 29), child soldiers continue to be used by other
groups. 30 There is evidence of “extensive participation” of child
soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and
Uganda, 31 as well as in other “areas of turmoil” including Sudan and
Afghanistan. 32 In a 2008 Global Report, the Coalition to Stop the Use
23. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 448.
24. Rosen, supra note 13.
25. Id.
26. David M. Rosen, Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, and the
Globalization of Childhood, 109 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST ASS’N 296, 297 (2007).
27. Rosen, supra note 13.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Noëlle Quénivet, The Liberal Discourse and the “New Wars” of/on Children, 38
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1053 (2013).
31. Id. at 1053.
32. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 432. Further, “[t]his crisis has in recent times prevailed in parts
of Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East.” Id. at 448; see, e.g., id. at 449–50
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of Child Soldiers concluded that “the military recruitment of children
(under-18s) and their use in hostilities . . . still takes place in one form
or another in at least 86 countries and territories worldwide.” 33
These countries and territories are currently in the midst of armed
conflict, and are also likely dealing with government instability,
particularly in Africa. 34 As a result of these conflicts, and due to the
“combination of poverty, isolation, and upheaval,” 35 children have
been used as “soldiers, spies, guards, human shields, human
minesweepers, servants, decoys and sentries.” 36 In those positions, and
due to their part in the armed conflict, children are “tortured, raped,
mutilated, humiliated, and degraded on a scale that is almost
incomprehensible,” 37 even culminating in some instances with armies
forcing them to kill their own family members. 38
The concept of a child soldier is controversial and highly political,
which makes it difficult to address with regard to international
humanitarian norms. 39 Reports of the exact number of child soldiers
vary from about 250,000 40 to 300,000, 41 and fluctuate based on
conflict across the world. 42 One of the problems with trying to
estimate the number of children used as soldiers is that although most
statistics claim to be “derived from field-based research,” they are

(stating the idea that although it is not typically the practice any more, some nations still utilize
children as soldiers, including Chad, Burma, and Sudan).
33. Id. at 448 (quoting Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers: Global
Report
2008,
3
(2008),
http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport. org/files/country_
pdfs/FINAL_2008_Global_Report.pdf); see also https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/2008/
children/Child_Soldiers_Global_Report_Summary.pdf; Panjabi, supra note 9, at 448 (stating that
“children have been kidnapped and forced to become child soldiers, a clear and egregious violation
of international law, and a practice that involves state and non-state actors, conventional armies,
and terrorist groups”).
34. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 447.
35. Id. at 448.
36. Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Labor: Bureau of Int’l Labor Affairs, The Worst Forms of
Child Labor, in CHILD LABOR AND SWEATSHOPS 21 (Ann Manheimer ed., 2006)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 449.
39. Rosen, supra note 26, at 297 (“[I]nternational law regarding the realm of child
soldiers is “built on the humanitarian definition of childhood, [and thus] it inevitably clashes with
many local understandings of the involvement of young people in war.”).
40. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7.
41. Hart, supra note 10, at 217.
42. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7.
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not. 43 Ultimately, the figure is “not only unknown but unknowable.”44
Regardless of the exact numbers, the scale of the problem is
catastrophic and deserves the international community’s focused
attention—it must find ways to intervene and prevent the continuing
recruitment and use of child soldiers.
1. Children are unexpectedly effective soldiers, preserving a lamentable
incentive to deploy them
It may initially seem that children would not make the most
effective soldiers. They are smaller in stature and less mature, which
would arguably make them less effective fighters than adults.
However, the opposite actually proves true. Some view child soldiers
as ideal members of an army. 45 They believe that “child soldiers
become model soldiers. They are preferred because [they are] blessed
with great endurance, the ability to survive on relatively little food and
water, [and because] child soldiers accept orders with few
questions.” 46 In addition, they are easier to manipulate and brainwash;
their small stature and lack of maturity may make them easier to
intimidate or force to fight. 47
2. Child Soldiering has negative effects on children
The effects on child soldiers are far deeper and longer-lasting than
simply the time and physical effort it takes them to serve in armed
conflicts. Many who are “trapped in this cycle of violence . . . suffer
from a variety of psychological and physical problems; their health is
43. Hart, supra note 10, at 217.
44. Id. at 217 (quoting RACHEL BRETT & MARGARET MCCALLIN, CHILDREN: THE
INVISIBLE SOLDIERS 27 (1996)). Part of the problem with determining a number of child
soldiers is that different actors in the international community have their own definitions of what
is or is not a child soldier. Many groups would not classify children in their non-state armed
community as a soldier. In addition, if actors or groups are familiar with the international
community’s disapproval of child soldiery, they may be reluctant to report or reveal their use of
child soldiers.
45. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 449.
46. Id. (quoting Kingsley Banya & Juliet Elu, The Dilemma of Child Soldiering in Sub-Saharan
Africa, in ‘SUFFER THE LITTLE CHILDREN’: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
CHILD POVERTY AND PUBLIC POLICY 177, 184 (Carol Yeakey et al. eds., 2006)).
47. See Konge, supra note 9, at 55 (stating that “young people have heightened
vulnerability, less maturity and a reduced capacity for moral judgment”) (internal
citations omitted).
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severely compromised.” 48 Further, the “emotional scars on such
young minds continue for years.” 49 Girls are often brought into armed
conflict to serve as sex slaves, and some even become mothers while
they are involved in the conflict. 50 In those situations, the effects of
being a child involved in armed conflict are indisputably permanent.
3. “Voluntary” enlistment is not really voluntary
The situation is not simple, especially because “children have
engaged with military groups for a host of reasons.” 51 Whether or not
they are fighting in the war, it might be that children simply join an
ANSA group to have a place to live, or because joining adds some
structure and consistency to their lives. 52 If given the choice, many
would even choose to stay with ANSAs rather than going back to their
homes. 53 This may be because there are situations where the
shortcomings of the international community “created scenarios
where children were willing to return to non-state armed forces, as
conditions there were more familiar and better responded to
children’s needs.” 54
Geneva Call, through a voluntary survey sent to ANSAs, found
that many of their responses “highlight that children often come to
[A]NSAs looking for protection, care, excitement, or the chance for
revenge.” 55 Some scholars even take the view that the majority of
children numbered among the ranks of child soldiers are voluntary
recruits. Jonathan Somer, the former Legal Advisor and Programme
Coordinator on Children and Armed non-State Actors for Geneva

48. Id. at 450.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Hart, supra note 10, at 218.
52. See GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 6.
53. Jonathan Somer, Engaging Armed Non-State Actors to Protect Children from the
Effects of Armed Conflict: When the Stick Doesn’t Cut the Mustard, 4 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 106,
109 (2012).
54. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 4.
55. Id. at 6.
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Call, 56 remarked, “experience seems to indicate that worldwide there
are many more ‘voluntary’ than forced recruits.” 57
But what constitutes “voluntary?” If a soldier holds a gun to the
head of a child until he or she “volunteers” to join the group, then is
participation really voluntary? As one scholar cautioned, “[g]iven a
child’s surroundings and circumstances during a war, viewing a child’s
participation as voluntary is suspect.” 58 The idea that children’s
“voluntary” enlistment as soldiers stems from their lack of alternatives
squares with traditional notions of child innocence. 59 Moreover, “it
can be immensely distressing to contemplate the notion that children
may serve effectively and willingly as soldiers, taking the lives of
others.” 60 In addition, the conceptual idea that children may
voluntarily engage in armed conflict “also entails an emotional
challenge,” due to the “innocence and sacredness of childhood.” 61
In some instances, children may join an ANSA group without
realizing the meaning of that group’s involvement in armed conflict.
For example, the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, reported
the following:
A few children appear in JEM camps for different reasons—fleeing
away following attacks on their villages; looking for food and shelter;
wanting to connect with relatives in the army or simply for curiosity
and fun. JEM always takes care of these children and sends them
back to their families or refugee camps. 62

56. Jonathan
Somer,
PERSONA
GRATA
CONSULTING,
http://pgconsult.net/PROFILE/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
57. Somer, supra note 53, at 117.
58. Konge, supra note 8, at 66.
59. Child innocence is a widely accepted view, even in the criminal world. For example,
domestic law typically treats children as incapable of consenting to certain crimes such as
underage sex. Tamar R. Birckhead, The “Youngest Profession”: Consent, Autonomy, and
Prostituted Children, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1097 (2011) (stating that “children should not
be morally culpable for acts to which they cannot legally consent,” and further arguing that
children who are statutorily raped “should be considered to lack the capacity to consent to sex”)
(citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 276 (1980); In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818, 820
(Tex. 2010) (“The notion that an underage child cannot legally consent to sex is of longstanding
origin and derives from the common law.”)).
60. Hart, supra note 10, at 224.
61. Id.
62. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 18.

998

5.HAFEN.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

989

11/28/2016 5:22 PM

Incentivizing Armed Non-State Actors

In such cases, even though the children would undoubtedly be
involved in aspects of armed conflict, if only by association, would they
qualify as voluntary child soldiers?
The issue of voluntariness is not a legal issue as much as a moral
one. There are not laws governing whether a child’s involvement in
armed conflict can or cannot be voluntary, but rather on whether
children are allowed to participate at all, regardless of how they
became involved in the conflict. The idea of a child voluntarily
enlisting strikes moral discord, and the law and international standards
accordingly preclude the use of child soldiers, whether voluntary or
not. Regardless of the exact definition of what constitutes a child
soldier “volunteer,” there is a risk that “permitting voluntary
association is a slippery slope that may lead to recruitment and use.”63
Further, if children were allowed to “voluntarily” enlist, the line
between forced recruitment and voluntary enlistment would become
very gray—”voluntary” enlistment would most likely not be
“voluntary.” In addition, children may mistake the motives of ANSA
groups and volunteer with false expectations only to find themselves
unwittingly in the middle of armed conflict.
Regardless of how children become involved with ANSAs, and
despite the nuances between specific situations, it is worth considering
the contexts that result in the use of child soldiers, 64 and how best to
deal with the problem. So far, the international community “has
developed only very short term instruments for dealing with the issue
of children in war.” 65 Even if there is not a flawless solution available,
legal steps must be taken. And “[i]n determining what the law ought
to be, we should consider whom the law is most likely to affect.”66
Based on the allegations that the primary users of child soldiers are
ANSAs, 67 it would seem that involving ANSAs in the solution is crucial
to solving the problem. 68 Further, despite the fact that international
law is not binding on ANSAs, protecting and respecting the rights of

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Somer, supra note 53, at 117.
Konge, supra note 8, at 72.
GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 4.
Konge, supra note 8, at 72.
See Rosen, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
Konge, supra note 8, at 72; see also GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 5.
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children in war are obligations and standards to which ANSAs should
still be held. 69
B. Current International Law on Child Soldiers
The history of international attempts to curb the use of child
soldiers is long and intricate. 70 One scholar noted that “[u]ntil
recently, virtually all rebel groups stood completely outside the
framework of international humanitarian law.” 71 Evidence of pressure
to change ANSAs’ isolation from the law includes the recent action by
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in
Armed Conflict who argued that “[ANSAs] are under a legal
obligation not to recruit or use child soldiers.” 72 In fact, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, or ICRC, reported that
over 140 rules attempted to help govern ANSA conduct as of 2005.73
However, as mentioned, it is widely accepted that human rights
treaties encompass “hard legal obligations” for states only, and not for
ANSAs. 74 There are varying views as to if and how these laws could
apply to ANSAs based on whether they qualify as a “party” to
conflict, 75 but most scholars agree that international law is only
69. Annyssa Bellal & Stuart Casey-Maslen, Enhancing Compliance with International
Law by Armed Non-State Actors, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 175, 189 (2011).
70. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 453.
71. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7.
72. Cedric Ryngaert & Anneleen Van de Meulebroucke, Enhancing and Enforcing
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups: An Inquiry into
Some Mechanisms, 16 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 443, 449 (2011).
73. Pascal Bongard & Jonathan Somer, Monitoring Armed Non-State Actor Compliance
with Humanitarian Norms: A Look at International Mechanisms and the Geneva Call Deed of
Commitment, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 673, 674 (2011).
74. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 449.
75. Based on specific language in each respective law, some scholars believe that the
following laws (which will be explicated in the following section) could imply that an ANSA
group could be a party: Geneva Conventions, Optional Protocol, Rome Statute, Protocol I, and
UNSCR. Although the language in these laws might suggest such a possibility, it remains that
ANSA groups are not generally recognized as parties. For example, Additional Protocol I, Article
43(1) states:
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups
and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not
recognized by an adverse Party.
Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries Protocol I: Armed Forces, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS (Aug.
31,
2016,
9:39
PM),
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
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binding on states. Even so, the international community has imposed
laws of varying quality governing the use of child soldiers, some hard
and some soft. 76 The next two sections will provide an overview
of each.
1. The international community has taken formal actions to prevent
child soldiering
The current formal actions, or “hard laws,” that apply to the use
of child soldiers include the following: Customary International
Humanitarian Law, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the involvement of children in armed conflict, the Rome Statute,
International Labour Organization’s Convention No. 182, Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, of 8 June
1977 (Protocol I), and UNSCRs. The age used to define a “child”
differs somewhat from rule to rule. These laws are formal and
customary, although they are not binding on ANSA groups.
Customary International Humanitarian Law “has its origins in the
customary practices of armies as they developed over the ages” 77 and
comes into existence when an act meets two elements: “Not only must
the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be
such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.” 78 Customary International Humanitarian Law “is of
Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=AF64638EB5530E58C12563CD0051DB9
3https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=
AF64638EB5530E58C12563CD0051DB93; see also Annyssa Bellal et al., International Law and
Armed Non-state Actors in Afghanistan, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 47, 51 n.22 (2011) (“[Article
43(1)] begs the question, of course, as to whether this provision has become a customary rule, as
neither Afghanistan nor the US was a party to Additional Protocol I at that time.”). But see
Quénivet, supra note 30, at 1080 (stating that despite the lack of participation in these rules,
international humanitarian law is in fact binding upon armed forces and armed groups).
76. “Hard law” includes formal customary and conventional international law, and is not
binding on ANSAs. “Soft law” is a less formal attempt to impose obligations on ANSAs by allowing
them to demonstrate commitment to international norms since international law cannot legally
bind them.
77. Introduction, Customary IHL, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
78. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Republic of Ger./Den.; Fed. Republic of
Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. ¶ 77 (Feb. 20); see also Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated
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crucial importance in today’s armed conflicts because it fills gaps left
by treaty law and so strengthens the protection offered to victims.”79
Further, it “continues to be relevant” because “while some States have
not ratified important treaty law, they remain nonetheless bound by
rules of customary law,” and also because of “the relative weakness of
treaty law governing non-international armed conflicts—those that
involve armed groups and usually take place within the boundaries of
one country.” 80 Rule 135 of the Customary International
Humanitarian Law states: “Children affected by armed conflict are
entitled to special respect and protection.” 81 Further, Rule 136 states:
“Children must not be recruited into armed forces or armed
groups,” 82 and Rule 137 follows with: “Children must not be allowed
to take part in hostilities.” 83 As a general rule, customary international
law is binding on all states. The particular language in this statute
regarding the special protection of children is fairly unique, but shows
the international community’s value on allowing children to remain
and act as children rather than soldiers.

Formation of Customary International Law, 20 ILSA J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 311 (2014);
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Summary), Public International Law, RWANTHIKA
GUNARATNE & PUB. INT’L L., https://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2014/
02/28/north-sea-continental-shelf-cases-summary/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) (“The North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases confirmed that both State practice (the objective element) and
opinion juris (the subjective element) are essential pre-requisites for the formation of a
customary law rule. This is consistent with Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ.”);
Customary International Law, Introduction, Customary IHL, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in_asofcuin (last visited Oct.
13, 2016).
COMM.
OF
THE
RED
CROSS,
79. Detail,
Customary
Law,
INT’L
https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law (last visited Oct. 13,
2016); see also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law,
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/customary-international-humanitarian-law-0 (2010).
80. Customary International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/customary-international-humanitarian-law-0 (2010).
81. Rule 135. Children, Customary IHL, I NT ’L C OMM. OF THE R ED CROSS,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule135 (last
visited Sept. 27, 2016).
82. Rule 136. Recruitment of Child Soldiers, Customary IHL, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule136
(last visited Sept. 27, 2016).
83. Rule 137. Participation of Child Soldiers in Hostilities, Customary IHL, INT’L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_
chapter39_rule137 (last visited Sept. 27, 2016).

1002

5.HAFEN.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

989

11/28/2016 5:22 PM

Incentivizing Armed Non-State Actors

Second, the Convention on the Rights of the Child outlines the
responsibilities of States Parties in Article 38. 84 Article 38(2) declares,
“States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons
who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part
in hostilities.” 85 “All feasible measures” is a strong phrase, illustrating
the extreme importance of protecting children in the eyes of the law.
In addition, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict,
ratified in 2000, notes a “need to increase the protection of children
from involvement in armed conflict,” defining a child as “every human
being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the
child, majority is attained earlier.” 86 The Optional Protocol also
includes a clause in Article 4(1) that states: “Armed groups that are
distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any
circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18
years.” 87 Interestingly, this law distinguishes between children used as
soldiers in state and non-state groups. It categorizes “with the gravest
concern the recruitment, training and use within and across national
borders of children in hostilities by armed groups distinct from the
armed forces of a State.” 88
Next, the Rome Statute, adopted in 1998, states in Article
8(2)(b)(xxvi) that “[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age
of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to
participate actively in hostilities” is a war crime. 89 The Rome Statute
created the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 as “an

84. G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 38, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989).
85. Id. at art. 38(2); see also Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 449
n.33 (pointing out that Article 38(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states: “State
Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of
fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities”).
86. G.A. Res. A/RES/54/263, ¶ 7 (May 25, 2000); see also Panjabi, supra note 9, at 451
(stating that the Geneva Convention also prohibits using children under age 15 from fighting in
armed conflicts).
87. Id. at art. 4(1).
88. Id. at ¶ 11.
89. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (entered into force July 1, 2002), [hereinafter Rome Statute].
This appears to be one of the first documents to distinguish a “child” from an “adult” based on
age, which is an idea now carried followed by most States.
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important new mechanism for implementing existing child
protection standards.” 90
The International Labour Organization, in Convention No. 182,
focused specifically on the worst forms of child labor, and categorized
using children in hostilities as such. In Article 3(a), it detailed
“compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict” as one
of the worst forms of child labor. 91 This draws an interesting parallel
between using children for labor within communities and within
groups involved in armed conflict, both of which are
deemed unallowable.
Protocol II states in Part II, Article 4(3)(c) that “children who
have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in
the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.”92
Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I, which discusses the protection
of children, states: “The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible
measures in order that children who have not attained the age of
fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular,
they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces.” 93 This
law contains the same strong language as the Convention on the
90. The International Criminal Court and Children’s Rights, THE AM. NON GOVERNMENTAL
ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-AMICCICCnChildRights.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2016); see also Konge, supra note 8, at 45 (“[T]he Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) codified the approach to take in determining
the law.”).
91. Int’l Lab. Org. [ILO], Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, art. 3(a) (June 17, 1999),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CO
DE:C182; see also Panjabi, supra note 9, at 451 (explaining that according to the International
Labor Organization’s Convention No. 182, which was adopted in 1999, “[c]ompulsory
recruitment of children is classified as one of the ‘worst forms of child labor’”).
92. http://cpwg.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/08/AP-I-and-II-to-theGeneva-Conventions.pdf; see also Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 449 n.34
(explaining that the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in Article
4(3)(c) APII states, “[C]hildren who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be
recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities”); id. at 449
(stating that Article 4, in fact, specifically imposes obligations on ANSAs, by providing in Article
4(1) that “[a]rmed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under
any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years”).
93. Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, supra note 75; see also Ryngaert & Van de
Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 449 n.33 (stating that in “Art 77(2) AP I: ‘The Parties to the
conflicts shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the age of
fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from
recruiting them into their armed forces’”).
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Rights of the Child in mandating that parties “take all feasible
measures” to keep children out of armed conflict.
The United Nations Security Council’s adoption of Resolutions
1539 and 1612 (in 2004 and 2005 respectively) has also been
particularly effective in increasing awareness of the child soldier
problem, “[c]alling for the establishment of a monitoring and reporting
mechanism on children and armed conflict.” 94
These formal actions regarding the use of child soldiers illustrate
the international community’s views on recruiting and using children
in armed conflict. Although, again, not binding on ANSAs, these laws
reflect the international community’s intolerance for the use of child
soldiers, whether in a state or ANSA group.
2. The international community has taken informal actions to prevent
child soldiering
Soft law illustrates other instances of the international community’s
inclination to regulate the use of child soldiers, particularly in regard to
ANSAs. Again, even though ANSAs are generally not bound by
international law, they are involved in the use of child soldiers, and these
rules exist in the international forum to help with that problem. These soft
laws include Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms (MRMs), such as the
one by the Secretary General to the UN Security Council, and other
individual acts, including unilateral acts and Deeds of Commitment.
MRMs are ways to watch and keep track of compliance by these
armed groups. One MRM, established by the UN Security Council in
2005, “monitors the conduct of all parties, whether State of nonState, to a conflict listed in the most recent report of the SecretaryGeneral on children and armed conflict.” 95 In this MRM, “action
plans are designed in which armed groups commit themselves to
halting the new recruitment of child soldiers and releasing already
recruited child soldiers,” 96 and currently there are “[twelve] action
plans [that] have been adopted and [twenty] country situations, not
necessarily conflicts, [which] are being monitored.” 97

94.
95.
96.
97.

Panjabi, supra note 9, at 451.
See also Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 458–59.
Id. at 459.
Id.
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Despite the challenges of soft law,98 various agreements with
international organizations “seem to have had a positive effect on
compliance.” 99 There is some indication that “armed groups have sought
to bind themselves by particular humanitarian law rules and there is
evidence to suggest that this has affected their behavior.”100
UNICEF, for example, has “provided care, technical guidance and,
at times, financial support for the successful implementation of national
programmes for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.”101
UNICEF supports their “intent to end child recruitment” 102 through
documents such as Deeds of Commitment similar to the one created by
Geneva Call. The Karen National Union (KNU) of Burma, Myanmar,
for example, “has signed a Deed of Commitment . . .
with UNICEF.” 103
Other groups, such as the Chin National Front/Chin National
Army (CNF/CAN) in 2009, have signed similar unilateral Deeds of
Commitment “pledging not to recruit and use child soldiers.” 104 In
addition,
the
Kachin
Independence
Organisation/Kachin
Independence Army (KIO/KIA) “[has] also indicated [its]
98. These soft laws can be difficult to implement because often the government will not
allow the UN or other similar groups to gain close enough access to the ANSAs to make action
plans. CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, CHANCE FOR CHANGE: ENDING THE RECRUITMENT AND USE
OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN MYANMAR 29 (2013) [hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L]. For
example, KNU stated that they “sent a letter of invitation to the UN Special Representative of
the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to visit . . . but there has not been a
response.” GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 23–24. They report that their group does not use
child soldiers, but that the Burmese national army does. Id. at 21. Similarly, JEM reports that
“NGOs are unable to cooperate with JEM regarding protection of children, as they require
government permission to do so.” Id. at 18. In their view, “[i]nternational organizations working
in this field are reluctant to work with JEM as that will jeopardize their dealings with the
Government of Sudan.” Id.
99. Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging
Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107,
143 (2012).
100. Id. at 127.
101. U.N. INT’L CHILDREN’S EMERGENCY FUND, FACTSHEET: CHILD SOLDIERS 2–3.
102. CHILD S OLDIERS I NT’L, supra note 98, at 28. (“Some armed groups including
the KNU/KNLA and the Karenni National Peoples Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA)
expressed their intent to end child recruitment by signing deeds of commitment not to
recruit or use children in 2007.”).
103. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 23.
104. CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, supra note 98, at 28; id. at 28 n.151 (“A copy of the Deed
of Commitment was transmitted by the CNF/CAN to the UN in March 2009 together with a
request for assistance in its implementation.”).
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willingness to sign [D]eeds of [C]ommitment not to use or recruit
child soldiers.” 105
Deeds of Commitment are simply unilateral statements that are
not inherently binding. However, they are analogous to unilateral
statements by states. In some cases, those unilateral statements by
states have been found to be binding. 106 For example, France issued a
statement that it would stop testing nuclear weapons, 107 which was
recognized as a unilateral statement in 1995 by the UN Security
Council. 108 The International Court of Justice later found that
unilateral act to be binding. 109 If ANSAs understand that concept and
take on a Deed of Commitment voluntarily, knowing and intending
that it would serve the same legal purpose of a state’s unilateral act by
signifying the ANSA’s commitment to abide by international norms,
the ANSA could be legally bound by such a statement. 110
III. THE PROBLEM: ANSAS AND CHILD SOLDIERS
A. ANSAs are the Main Perpetuators of the Child Soldier Problem
ANSAs, as previously defined, are non-governmental groups who
are involved in armed conflict but “lack the capacity to become party

105. Id. at 28.
106. The International Court of Justice “indeed support[s] the proposition that a unilateral
statement may bind a state when the statement expresses an intention to be bound which could in
good faith be relied on by other states.” BENITO MÜLLER ET AL., UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS:
THE MISSING LEGAL LINK IN THE BALI ACTION PLAN 6 (2010).
107. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Summary of the Summary of the Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep.
(Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep., ¶ 33–35 (Dec. 20).
108. See France Will Not Lower Its Nuclear Guard, Vows President, FRANCE IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/France-will-not-lowerits-nuclear.
109. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Summary of the Summary of the Judgment, 1974 I.C.J.
Rep. (Dec. 20); see also Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep., ¶ 46 (Dec. 20)
(“It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or
factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations.”)
110. See Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 143 (noting that “[t]here is some
acceptance in the literature of the binding nature of unilateral declarations made by nonstate
actors,” such as a Deed of Commitment); see also GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note
20 (stating that even though ANSAs do not have the ability to “become parties to relevant
international treaties, and are generally precluded from participating in norm-making processes,”
they still retain the ability to make unilateral statements, though they may not be binding).
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to the relevant international treaties.” 111 Recent ANSAs include JEM
in Sudan, 112 Boko Haram in Nigeria, 113 the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), 114 and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, 115 in addition
to many others. Even though these groups are not state actors, they
still may be supported by states in armed conflict. 116 However, despite
those associations and the fact that ANSAs “have no single ideological
commitment,” 117 they are all “outsiders” on the world stage, and most
governments and the international community as a whole “reject them
as legitimate political actors.” 118
ANSAs can be widely regarded as a physical manifestation of social
problems, particularly because “they see themselves as representatives
of distinct interests and may build on broad support within
communities.” 119 Intentionally using child soldiers, however, does not

111. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 5; see also Claudia Hofmann & Ulrich Schneckener,
Engaging Non-State Armed Actors in State- and Peace-Building: Options and Strategies, 93 INT’L
REV. OF THE RED CROSS 603, 604 (2011) (stating that in general, they can be “defined as
distinctive organizations that are (i) willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their
objectives and (ii) not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies,
presidential guards, police, or special forces. They, therefore, (iii) possess a certain degree of
autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure”).
112. GENEVA CALL, Sudan, http://www.genevacall.org/country-page/sudan/ (last
visited Sept. 28, 2016); see also GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, Mission,
http://www.genevacall.org/who-we-are/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
113. See Ahmed Rufai Abubakar, The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria, in UNITED NATIONS
SYSTEM STAFF COLLEGE, UNDERSTANDING A NEW GENERATION OF NON-STATE ARMED
GROUPS 45–54 (2014) (ebook).
114. See Sarah Sensamaust, Non-State Actors in Colombia, Guatemala and Nicaragua, 8 J.
Nov.
2004,
CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS
DESTRUCTION,
http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/8.2/feature/sensamaust.htm.
115. Iraq: Non-State Actors, RULE OF LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS PROJECT
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/non-state_armed_groups.php?id_state=110
(last
updated Apr. 13, 2012).
116. Jean d’Aspremont et al., Sharing Responsibility Between Non-State Actors and States
in International Law: Introduction, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 49, 58 (“[S]tates may provide
support to non-state actors, or non-state actors may provide support to . . . states, in violation
of international law.”).
117. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7; see also GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 5 (Geneva Call
itself stressed that “[A]NSAs are not monolithic; they have different motivations, structures, and
competencies, and therefore generalizations should be avoided.”). They “differ widely in kind,
displaying different forms of appearance, aims, and underlying motivations.” Hofmann &
Schneckener, supra note 111, at 619.
118. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7.
119. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 604; see also Somer, supra note 53, at
116 (stating that they are “intertwined with supportive communities”); GENEVA CALL, supra
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appear to be one of the interests they represent. If fact, they generally
view themselves as protectors of children. 120 That is one of the most
dangerous components of the child soldier problem. “[A]ssociation of
children with ANSAs may be the best of bad options during conflict
situations,” 121 and the ANSA group might feel that they are doing the
children a favor by taking them in. In ANSAs’ views, they are helping,
not recruiting, children. 122
As mentioned, permitting these volunteers may lead to their use
as actual soldiers. 123 However, Jonathan Somer indicated that this
risk can be mitigated by making it clear to ANSAs that the best
interests of the child should be the guiding principle, and if they do
have associated children, they should take extra precautions in their
internal implementation systems to ensure that such children are not
recruited or used in hostilities. 124

If ANSAs believe that they are taking children in and not using them as
soldiers, then hopefully they would abide by this suggestion. As another
scholar stated, “no matter how noble the cause of any belligerent, it can
never justify the use of children in hostilities or other violations against
them.” 125 However, this is unlikely to be an effective remedy to the
problem of child soldiers. This solution is not concrete and reliable, and
does not have the strength to force an ANSA group who is already not
abiding by international norms to start complying. Finding a better
solution with the power to change ANSA behavior is imperative.

note 1, at 6 (stating that their views of themselves and their role in regard to child soldiers also
illustrates that there are important nuances in the situation, which only make it more difficult).
120. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 6; see also Somer, supra note 53, at 113 (“One of the
major realizations to come out of . . . consultations with ANSAs is that in many cases they
consider themselves to be child protection actors.”); GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 6 (arguing
that ANSAs consider themselves to have a “protection role” extending “well beyond the
prohibition on the recruitment of children and their use in hostilities”).
121. Somer, supra note 53, at 116 (stating that some children simply may get involved
because their parents are fighters in an ANSA community).
122. Id. (stating that some children simply may get involved because their parents are
fighters in an ANSA community).
123. Id. at 117.
124. Somer, supra note 53, at 117.
125. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 4.
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B. ANSAs are not Traditionally Subject to International Law
Hard law does not bind ANSAs, as long as they are not considered
“Parties,” 126 and soft law, at best, might be persuasive. If an ANSA
could be considered a “Party” according to international law, then it
would be much more likely that hard law would be binding on it.
Whether soft law applies would be circumstantial depending on the
ANSA’s willingness to participate. One scholar noted that “[a]t most,
[ANSAs] have indirect horizontal obligations under a human rights
treaty such as the Optional Protocol: States are under the international
obligation to regulate, at the domestic level, the child recruitment
practices of [ANSAs].” 127 As mentioned, ANSAs do not have “the full
extent of rights and obligations as States,” 128 which could illustrate
why they may not feel compelled to change their behavior in the
international community.
Further, “[a]s non-state entities, [ANSAs] cannot participate in
the creation of the international legal norms regulating these issues,
nor can they become parties to international treaties—yet efforts to
improve the protection of civilians during armed conflict cannot
afford to ignore ANSAs.” 129 Despite their reluctance to conform to
these current international standards, “the practice of the United
Nations, as well as of other international and regional organizations
shows that efforts are increasingly being made to hold ANSAs
accountable at the international level for the violation of international
norms.” 130 Despite the lack of binding international law and the fact
that ANSAs are not considered “Parties,” these efforts may become
effective if implemented in a way that would be compelling to ANSA
groups. In order to protect children involved in these conflicts, ANSAs
must be held to a higher standard of complying with
international norms.

126. See supra Section III.A (discussing how ANSAs cannot become parties to
international treaties).
127. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 449.
128. Bellal & Casey-Maslen, supra note 69, at 188.
129. Pauline Lacroix et al., Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in Mechanisms for Protection,
37 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 10, 10 (2011).
130. Bellal & Casey-Maslen, supra note 69, at 176–77.
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C. ANSAs are Unlikely to Voluntarily Conform to International Law
on the Child Soldier Issue
Despite the strong international opinion against using child
soldiers, “[i]nternational efforts to curb the use of child soldiers by nonstate actors have had only limited success.” 131 ANSAs might be reluctant
to comply due to their distrust of the international community. 132 One
scholar opined that ANSAs may hesitate to negotiate with international
organizations because they fear that the information they give might
then “be used to take action against members of the ANSA or the
ANSA itself.”133
Although ANSAs could potentially be innocent in this problem,
ANSAs might reject international standards because they do not agree
with international views of the rights of children involved in armed
conflict, and how violators of those international norms should be
treated. 134 Many ANSAs believe that “the applicable standards have
largely been forged in the West and imposed upon the rest of the
world.” 135 Further, “[b]y labelling acts that are not contrary to
international law as violations, the international community risks
alienating ANSAs who genuinely feel they are protecting children.”136
Because “many ANSAs are sensitive towards their perception of their
role as child protection actors,” 137 such improper labeling can be a
dangerous way of engaging these groups. Because ANSAs cannot help
create these international laws, they “may not feel bound to abide by
rules that they have neither put forward nor formally adhered to.”138
It is also possible that ANSAs do not participate in international
humanitarian law because they are “simply not aware of
their obligations.” 139

131. David M. Rosen, Who Is a Child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers, 25 CONN.
J. INT’L L. 81, 87 (2009).
132. See Bongard & Somer, supra note, 73 at 685 (supporting the idea that ANSAs may
feel distrustful due to “the state-centric nature of international law” which “poses challenges
when it comes to addressing [the behavior of ANSAs]”).
133. Pauline Lacroix et al., supra note 129, at 11–12.
134. See Rosen, supra note 13, at 8.
135. Id.
136. Somer, supra note 53, at 117.
137. Id. at 121.
138. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20.
139. Id.
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Even when ANSAs do attempt to abide by these norms, their
efforts often go unrecognized. At times, “international courts have
. . . referred favorably to undertakings by armed groups,” 140 but
“nation states will not ordinarily grant recognition to rebel groups,
even though there is considerable evidence that, when they do, both
sides to a conflict are more likely to observe the laws of war.” 141 One
scholar opined that although international law requires that ANSAs
avoid using child soldiers, “even if these groups were to strictly adhere
to the laws of war, their efforts likely would yield no tangible rewards.
They would still be considered criminals under domestic law and
would receive no international recognition of the legitimacy of their
causes.” 142 This lack of recognition illustrates another reason why it is
hard to engage ANSAs to comply with international laws. 143 For these
reasons, “laws banning recruitment have had little or no influence on
the behavior of non-state actors.” 144
IV. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)
UN representatives have attempted to negotiate with ANSAs, but
have “found it very difficult to achieve progress.” 145 Unsurprisingly,
ANSAs generally “have a hostile view of the UN, are excluded from
its proceedings, and have little or no stake in its decisions, which
renders UN efforts at persuasion generally ineffective.” 146 Other
groups have proven more successful, primarily non-governmental
organizations, or NGOs, such as Geneva Call. 147 NGOs “have a strong
capacity to influence public opinion . . . , to educate and raise
awareness about certain issues, to lobby political decision-makers, and

140. Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 143.
141. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 8.
145. Rosen, supra note 131, at 87.
146. Id.
147. One scholar offers the opinion that “[a] fine example of another organization that
offers advisory services to [ANSAs]—and only [ANSAs] for that matter—is Geneva Call, which
provides [ANSAs] which sign up to the ‘Deed of Commitment’ sound implementation advice.”
Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 458.
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to engage with diplomatically unacknowledged actors, such as nonstate armed actors without implying a political shift in their favour.” 148
Indeed, “NGOs’ long-term engagement in relevant fields often
grants them a certain amount of trust even from [ANSAs].” 149 They
are known as “neutral and independent actors,” and “benefit from
[that] reputation” even if not everyone perceives them that way. 150
This advantageously “puts [NGOs] into a position to act as a
facilitator for specific issues.” 151 NGOs have great potential to
influence ANSAs to look toward and increase compliance with
international humanitarian norms.
Providing ANSAs an opportunity to commit to and abide by
humanitarian law norms could also “improve compliance by the states
they fight against.” 152 This is noteworthy particularly because some
states have been hesitant to sign humanitarian law instruments due to
the lack of reciprocity by the ANSAs. 153 This reluctance could be
remedied by “[a]llowing armed groups to demonstrate formally their
commitment to be bound, or to express their intention to comply with
existing legal obligations” 154 through NGOs.
In order to help ANSAs, these NGOs “focus heavily on the
transmission of information and knowledge, including technical
knowledge, and aim to [empathetically] persuade armed actors” 155 to
comply with international norms. This approach is empathetic,
flexible, and principle-oriented, and can adjust to varying situations of
individual ANSAs. 156 This will prove to be important because, due to
148. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618; see also Rosen, supra note 26, at
296 (stating that NGOs have been “enormously influential in shaping the international legal
treaties that seek to ban the use of child soldiers”).
149. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618.
150. Id.
151. Id. But see id. at 617 (“NGOs usually lack the capacities to employ serious leverage
and effective bargaining attempts. Their goals for an engagement of armed actors may also differ
distinctly from those of states.”).
152. Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 129.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618; see, e.g., GENEVA CALL, supra note
1, at 18–19 (stating that one ANSA, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), has “invited
numerous organizations to visit its areas to discuss adherence to child protection codes” and that
it would welcome further training).
156. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618 (stating that because of the
effectiveness of these techniques, “NGOs are in the fairly unique position of being able to
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the unique situations of different ANSAs, various sticks and carrots
may be needed to maximize compliance. Geneva Call utilizes its
unique position as an NGO by intentionally approaching ANSAs to
“provide a platform for . . . [them] to adhere to international
norms.” 157 The international community should find ways to
incentivize ANSAs to sign and comply with the Deed of Commitment
for the Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict.
V. DEEDS OF COMMITMENT
A Deed of Commitment is a mechanism created by Geneva Call
to “allow . . . ANSAs to pledge to respect humanitarian norms and be
held publically accountable for their commitments.” 158 There are
different types of Deeds of Commitment that all follow the same
process. 159 Geneva Call began offering a Deed of Commitment as a
specific pledge to abstain from the use of anti-personnel (AP)
landmines in 2000. 160 This Deed has so far proven to be effective: as
of 2015, forty-nine ANSAs have signed the Deed of Commitment
banning AP mines, 161 and compliance “has been good.” 162 Scholars
have argued, “the most important mechanism through which
unilateral acts by [ANSAs] are created is . . . Geneva Call’s Deed
of [C]ommitment.” 163

communicate with non-state armed actors independently of political circumstances”). But see
GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that NGOs cannot directly interact with JEM
regarding the protection of children in armed conflict, because government permission
is required).
157. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618.
158. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20.
159. Id.
160. GENEVA CALL, Deed of Commitment, supra note 15.
161. GENEVA CALL, What We Do, Landmine Ban, http://www.genevacall.org/what-wedo/landmine-ban/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
162. GENEVA CALL, Success Stories, http://genevacall.org/success-stories/ (last visited Sept.
29, 2016).
163. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 447 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 127 (“For example, Geneva Call, a
Geneva-based organization dedicated to engaging armed groups in respecting and adhering to
humanitarian norms, created a Deed of Commitment on anti-personal mines that can be signed
by ‘armed non-state actors.’”); GENEVA CALL, What We Do, Landmine Ban, supra note 161
(suggesting that although there was a 1997 AP Mine Ban Convention to which seventy-five
percent of the world’s states are a party, this does not apply to ANSAs, and thus does not give
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After the success of the Deed banning AP landmines, Geneva Call
expanded the reach of its Deeds of Commitment and created others
to help ANSAs comply with other humanitarian norms. 164 With
Deeds, and in anticipation of similar success, a snowball effect can take
place by “[a]llowing armed groups to agree to comply with
humanitarian law norms [that] can also influence other armed groups
to agree to comply with such norms, either directly through peer
pressure or indirectly through example setting.” 165 Arguably, as the
reach of the Deeds expands, the number of signatories will
correspondingly increase. 166 This is an idea that has “particular
promise,” especially because it appears that in terms of NGOs
influencing armed groups, Geneva Call “remains the most
influential actor.” 167
A. Geneva Call
Members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
originally launched Geneva Call in March of 2000.168 It is a “neutral
and impartial humanitarian non-governmental organization dedicated
to engaging . . . [A]NSAs . . . towards compliance with the norms of
international humanitarian law.” 169
Since its conception, it has “engaged in dialogue with some 90
ANSAs worldwide.” 170 Geneva Call “focuses on [A]NSAs that operate
outside effective State control and that are primarily motivated by
political goals, which include armed movements, de facto authorities,
and internationally non-recognized or partially recognized States.” 171

them an opportunity to prove compliance with international humanitarian norms); supra Section
IV.B (discussing Deeds of Commitment as unilateral acts)
164. GENEVA CALL, Deed of Commitment, supra note 15.
165. Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 130 (“Geneva Call incorporates this
potential for influence into its strategy for engagement.”).
166. See id. at 131 (Not only do Deeds of Commitment provide an opportunity for a group to
prove to the international community that the group can abide by international humanitarian norms,
but also that they can expand the foundation for engaging armed actors in the first place: “If several
armed groups are involved in the same armed conflict, even if they are not formally related, links
between them create the potential for peer influence”).
167. Id. at 131–32.
168. Somer, supra note 53, at 107.
169. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 32.
170. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, Mission, supra note 112.
171. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 32.
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Geneva Call remains “dedicated to promoting respect by armed
non-State actors (ANSAs) for international humanitarian norms in
armed conflict and other situations of violence.” 172 Although there are
a variety of types of ANSAs, Geneva Call specifically directs its focus
toward “organized armed entities involved in internal armed conflicts
that are primarily motivated by political goals, operate outside State
control and therefore lack legal capacity to become party to relevant
international treaties.” 173 It offers help to these groups in many ways,
“such as providing advice on policy revision, organizing training
workshops, and/or developing educational materials to help
signatories disseminate their new policies to their rank and file.” 174 It
also “responds to requests from ANSAs to help build their knowledge
of, and capacities to implement international humanitarian norms.”175
Additionally, “[i]n some cases, Geneva Call brings in partner
organizations to support ANSAs in the implementation of
their commitments.” 176
B. Geneva Call and Deeds of Commitment
1. The success of the Deed of Commitment banning land mines
Geneva Call secured a successful foundation for their Deeds of
Commitment through the Deed banning land mines. The success of
the Deed may be due to “the organisation[‘s] . . . ‘inclusive approach,’
refraining from employing coercive means (such as ‘naming and
shaming’) but seeking rather to achieve change through dialogue,
persuasion and cooperation.” 177 The fact that “[m]any of the
signatories used anti-personnel mines before signing the Deed,
[suggests] that the Deed has had some impact on their behavior.” 178
172. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, Mission, supra note 112.
173. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20.
174. Id.; see also GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, Mission, supra note 112.
175. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, Mission, supra note 112.
176. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20.
177. Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 10 (footnote omitted). The authors also noted, “[I]n
its efforts to address the lack of ownership of humanitarian norms by ANSAs, Geneva Call has
developed an innovative mechanism, the ‘Deed of Commitment.’” Id.
178. Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 128. Since the Deed banning AP mines
was implemented, “Geneva Call has reported a decline in the use of anti-personnel mines by
signatories to the Deed and has facilitated the destruction of numerous stockpiles of mines.” Id.
(citation omitted).
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Furthermore, “the engagement of ANSAs in the AP mine ban has
served as an entry point to highlighting the need to protect civilians
from other abuses.” 179 While these results were specifically noted in
application to mine bans, 180 the principles of the Deed of Commitment
worked well enough to merit the creation of other Deeds. 181 The Deed
of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of
Armed Conflict, for example, was launched in 2010. 182 Although it
does not yet have as many signatories as the Deed of Commitment
banning landmines, it has great potential to make a meaningful
international impact.
2. Child soldiers and Geneva Call
Addressing the international child soldier issue “is contemplated
in the founding statute of Geneva Call.” 183 The opportunity to begin
work in that area arose when Geneva Call saw the positive effects from
the Deed of Commitment on banning landmines, and “built on its
successes . . . by developing a new Deed of Commitment in respect of
child recruitment in armed conflict.” 184 As part of this Deed, ANSAs
can essentially issue a unilateral statement of their commitment to
comply with international norms regarding the use of child soldiers.185
In order to gauge interest in developing another Deed of
Commitment, Geneva Call held a meeting with “44 high-level
political and military representatives of 28 signatories and other
ANSAs engaged by Geneva Call” regarding the effectiveness of the
179. Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 10. Indeed, this original landmine Deed has provided
an important framework for future Deeds, and illustrates a template for further international
humanitarian success.
180. See GENEVA CALL, Landmine Ban, supra note 161 (stipulating that over 20,000
stockpiled AP mines have been destroyed since signatories “cooperated in humanitarian
mine action”).
181. Another scholar remarked that “[e]xperience with the Deed of Commitment Banning
AP Mines demonstrates not only that ANSAs can make humanitarian commitments but that they
can indeed co-operate in the scrutiny of their own compliance.” Bongard & Somer, supra note
132, at 706.
182. GENEVA CALL, Deed of Commitment, supra note 15.
183. Somer, supra note 53, at 108.
184. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 448.
185. Id. at 446; see also id. at 448 (stating that this happens “under relevant legal
instruments: two provisions of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Optional Protocol to the latter Convention,
and the Paris Principles and Guidelines”) (footnotes omitted).
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Deed banning land mines. 186 Geneva Call found that “[w]hile there
were different opinions on standards and the fairness of international
interventions, there was consensus to support Geneva Call’s efforts to
expand into the thematic area of children and armed conflict.”187
Those in attendance agreed that the Deed “should aim towards a
higher standard than the minimum imposed by international
obligations, but should not necessarily validate international (that is,
state) attempts to create different standards for ANSAs, as this could
be a dangerous precedent.” 188 Creating this new Deed was delicate
and important, not just because of the differences between legal
effects on states and ANSAs, but because a Deed of Commitment
regarding children would be much more complex. 189
When it created the new Deed, Geneva Call aimed to “understand
the perspectives of ANSAs and to feed this awareness into the
drafting.” 190 Geneva Call could already boast established relationships
with ANSAs, and consequently “was in a unique position to gather
these perspectives.” 191 These prior relationships, and the fact that the
Deed incorporated the views of ANSAs, helped maximize its
potential success.
There are significant differences in the Deed banning landmines
and the Deed to protect child soldiers; most notably, the central
component of the latter is living humans, which will require a “more
complex and convoluted legal framework” and involves the agency of
children 192—including their “human rights, needs, and desires.”193
Where land mines are inanimate objects, children “experience various
vulnerabilities,” resulting in a more complex picture where they are
directly influenced by the humanity of the situation. 194 Jonathan
Somer also noted that children are not passive actors, and that the

186. Somer, supra note 53, at 112.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 116 (footnote omitted).
189. Despite the dangers, it is hoped and expected that the “new Deed of Commitment
brings us all one step closer to protecting children in vulnerable situations.” GENEVA CALL, supra
note 1.
190. Somer, supra note 53, at 113.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 109.
193. Id.
194. Lacroix et. al., supra note 133, at 12.
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intervention would need to be more immediate than it was in the
earlier Deed. 195 In order to accommodate for these differences, and to
be most effective and efficient, the scope of the Deed is limited, and
intentionally so. 196
The first signatories to the Deed of Commitment for the
Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict were the
Karenni National Progressive Party, or Karenni Army, and the New
Mon State Party, or the Mon National Liberation Army from
Burma/Myanmar. 197 Signing the Deed provided them, and any other
ANSAs who have or will sign, the “opportunity to formally express
their agreement to abide by humanitarian norms and take ownership
of these rules.” 198 A signature alone does not “guarantee better respect
of humanitarian norms but provides a useful tool to hold signatories
accountable for their undertaking.” 199
Geneva Call helps monitor the compliance of the ANSA groups in
three ways: 1) providing ANSAs with self-monitoring mechanisms and
collecting reports; 2) independently monitoring ANSA compliance by
obtaining “information from a range of third-party actors present on
the ground (such as media, international and local organisations)”;
and 3) monitoring through field missions, which are “undertaken by
Geneva Call on a routine basis to follow up on implementation of the
Deeds of Commitment or to verify compliance in the event of
allegations of violations.” 200 Although these monitoring mechanisms
are in place, it is foundational and essential that Geneva Call engage
ANSAs with the intent to sign and comply.
In summary, a Deed of Commitment is a way for ANSAs to
unilaterally pledge compliance to international norms. 201 The previous
success of Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment banning landmines
indicates a likelihood for success in later Deeds, including the Deed of

195. Somer, supra note 53, at 109.
196. Id. at 115–16.
197. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, History, http://www.genevacall.org/who-weare/history/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
198. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20.
199. Id. The Deed “has been developed in cooperation with [ANSAs,]” and because of
that, the “chances of compliance by [ANSAs] rise considerably.” Ryngaert & Van de
Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 450.
200. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20.
201. See supra Section V.B.
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Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of
Armed Conflict. 202 The previously established relationship between
Geneva Call and ANSAs and the incorporation of ANSA perspectives
into the formation of this Deed further indicate a likelihood of its
success. 203 However, as the use of child soldiers has not been
completely eradicated, Geneva Call should look for ways to further
engage
ANSAs
and
increase
their
compliance
with
international norms.
VI. ENGAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
Although the Deed of Commitment has begun implementation,
Geneva Call still faces major challenges as it strives to maximize
success. Most obviously, a substantial number of ANSAs have not yet
become signatories to the Deed. 204 The methodology of engaging
ANSAs is one of the most important parts of the Deeds of
Commitment. Geneva Call “will not engage ANSAs on the territory
of concerned states if prohibited from doing so,” but “will engage
ANSAs extraterritorially” without the states’ “permission if warranted
by humanitarian concerns.” 205 Further, it is central to Geneva Call’s
ideals to implement the Deeds of Commitment through “an inclusive
process that [seeks] the approval and support of ANSAs themselves”
based on the “trust, relationships and reputation built up with the
ANSAs.” 206 Somer remarked that “[i]t is more important to get it right
than to race towards a large number of signatories.” 207
Access to many ANSA groups is difficult because some are
“fragmented,” resources are not unlimited, and states sometimes
refuse to allow Geneva Call to negotiate with ANSAs. 208 Also, some

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 450.
205. Somer, supra note 53, at 111; see also Bongard & Somer, supra note 132, at 689
(stating that although “[e]ngaging ANSAs has not been without its challenges and
controversy . . . Geneva Call has won international recognition and support for its efforts,
notably from state parties to the Ottawa Convention, the UN, the European Union, and the
African Union.”) (footnotes omitted).
206. Somer, supra note 53, at 109.
207. Id. at 120.
208. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 450.
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ANSAs themselves are unwilling to cooperate or engage. 209 In Somer’s
eyes, a “lesson not yet learned is how to influence the behaviour of
the most reluctant ANSAs.” 210 The Deeds of Commitment themselves
are effective, which means that they currently appeal to ANSAs.
However, the possibility of engaging the reluctant ANSAs demands
expanding and improving the methods used to engage these groups.
A. Improving ANSA Engagement and Compliance
Since ANSAs are not bound by international law, and because the
Deeds of Commitment have proven successful, it is crucially important
to encourage engagement and compliance with those Deeds. Geneva
Call understands that “[i]n order to engage an ANSA, it is important
to understand the factors that might influence it.” 211 Although many
mechanisms for enforcing compliance with international humanitarian
norms have proven to be insufficient so far, Geneva Call’s experience
with Deeds of Commitment has shown that “by taking an inclusive
approach, ANSAs can be engaged in changing their behaviour without
the threat or use of coercive means against them.” 212 One of the first
steps toward a common understanding is recognizing that ANSAs do
not exist in a “political and social vacuum.” 213
Many ANSAs “do not share, or flatly reject, the cultural views
about children or childhood held by the international community,”214
specifically in regard to international child soldier standards. Some
ANSAs “believe that the applicable standards have been created in
Western societies and imposed upon the rest of the world.” 215 Another
issue is that some ANSAs are simply terrorist organizations which have
“publicly demonstrated little or no interest in observing the laws of
war.” 216 This ANSA disinterest in, and antagonism toward,
international norms starkly highlights Geneva Call’s accomplishment
in creating a Deed of Commitment with which signatories continue
209. Id.
210. Somer, supra note 53, at 121.
211. Lacroix et. al., supra note 133, at 11.
212. Id. at 12.
213. Id. at 11.
214. Rosen, supra note 131, at 86.
215. Id. (footnote omitted).
216. Id. at 86–87 (footnote omitted) (“Many of these groups ignore both the domestic
laws of their own countries and international law.”). Id. at 87.
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to comply even if they may not agree with every nuance of the
international standards.
Geneva Call regards its Deeds as binding, “as do the signatories
themselves.” 217 Thus, signing the Deed boosts ANSA legitimacy. 218
The Deed was created with “built-in provisions on implementation
and monitoring.” 219 Importantly, since there is not a “one-size-fits-all
solution as each ANSA operates in a unique manner” it is essential that
the Deed’s language and processes are tailored to each group.220
Many of the Law of Armed Conflict violations by ANSAs might
be “due to a lack of actual knowledge of the content,” and in that
sense, participation in the Deed of Commitment can also educate
ANSAs about international humanitarian norms. 221 This educational
opportunity is likely already currently incentivizing some ANSAs,
particularly if they would like to be legitimate political actors but only
have limited options for learning international law. Geneva Call
“provides ANSAs the opportunity to become part of an international
humanitarian mechanism” 222 through signing a Deed of
Commitment, and compliance is of the utmost importance.
Although compliance is good once ANSAs sign a Deed of
Commitment, one major difficulty is enticing ANSA groups to sign in
the first place. Currently, there is no foolproof mechanism for
engaging ANSAs. One scholar remarked that “[t]hrowing money at
passive recipients only turns them into mendicants and wastes the
funds.” 223 Gaining successful ANSA compliance likely needs
improvements that progress step-by-step, 224 and in regard to child
soldiers, this could involve engaging ANSAs according to their
own standards. 225
Indeed, with a problem as complex as children in armed conflict,
“[i]t is wishful thinking to expect that any single tool . . . can

217. Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 143 (footnote omitted).
218. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 448.
219. Somer, supra note 53, at 118.
220. Id. at 118–19.
221. Anton O. Petrov, Non-State Actors and Law of Armed Conflict Revisited: Enforcing
International Law through Domestic Engagement, 19 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 279, 299 (2014).
222. Somer, supra note 53, at 120.
223. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 461.
224. Somer, supra note 53, at 122.
225. Id.
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maximize protection on its own.” 226 Two scholars, Hofmann and
Schneckener, opined that due to past experience, flexibility is
essential. 227 Arrangements that are appropriately flexible will likely
involve a mix of enforcements and incentives, or sticks and carrots,
which “allows international organizations to apply some leverage in
negotiations with non-state armed actors, either by punishing them (for
example, through economic sanctions or naming and shaming) or by
rewarding them.” 228 Indeed, deciding which norms will interest ANSAs
in compliance is a long-term process. 229 In order to be sustainable,
methods of engaging ANSAs to comply will likely be adjustable, and
will probably involve a mixture of sticks (sanctions) and
carrots (incentives). 230
Although it appears that Geneva Call is more inclined to utilize
carrots than sticks, the most effective methodology for engaging
ANSAs may involve any number of both. At this point, Geneva Call
has not shown one method to be any more successful than another.
The following sections will discuss how Geneva Call and other NGOs
could further use sticks and carrots to encourage ANSA compliance
with international norms regarding child soldiers through signing
Deeds of Commitment.
B. Sticks
Sticks are methods of enforcing behavior, and might be used as
compelling ways to persuade ANSAs to sign and comply with Deeds
of Commitment. One danger of engaging ANSAs is the possibility
that “some [ANSAs] will attempt to take a free ride on the positive
publicity generated by signing up to a Deed, without ever having had
226. Id.; see also id. at 123 (stating that Geneva Call has remarked that it is “convinced that
when the stick doesn’t cut the mustard—in other words, when a punitive approach does not
prove effective—it is a good thing that other methodologies exist which attempt to
comprehensively protect children under the control or influence of ANSAs”); see also Hofmann
& Schneckener, supra note 111, at 610 (stating that “in most instances, these strategies are not
used exclusively but in combination”).
227. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 606.
228. Id. at 615. In the eyes of Geneva Call, “engaging ANSAs is a long-term effort: it
involves constructive and sustained dialogue to persuade them to sign the Deed of Commitment,
and continues after signature through supporting its implementation and monitoring
compliance.” Bongard & Somer, supra note 132, at 686.
229. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618–19.
230. Id. at 610.
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the intention to genuinely respect [International Humanitarian
Law].” 231 Although using incentives rather than enforcement might
seem kinder, exclusively using carrots and disregarding sticks would
likely be ineffective. In situations where carrots would come up short
or appear too soft to truly be compelling, certain stick methods would
add compulsion and might prove helpful, or even necessary. Further,
not all ANSA groups are the same or act based on similar motivations.
Having a variety of methods for enforcing or incentivizing compliance
would present a greater platform for far-reaching success. The
following five options provide an overview of some possible stick
options for enforcing compliance with Deeds of Commitment.
1. Monitoring and reporting mechanisms (MRMs)
MRMs use reporting to put political pressure on groups who
violate norms by neglecting to comply with their commitments.232
This kind of pressure represents soft law, and could be used as a stick
in compelling ANSAs to comply with Deeds of Commitment.
However, because ANSAs “complain that there is no possibility of
refuting allegations of violations, and that the system is not particularly
accessible to them,” 233 this may not be a particularly effective option
to increase ANSA compliance with Deeds of Commitment.
2. Investigations and sanctions, or prosecution
Geneva Call typically does not use sanctions, but they might be
worth investigating as a constructive possibility for enforcing
compliance with Deeds of Commitment. Particularly if the idea of
sanctions as a method of compliance has not yet been tried, it may
prove effective for some ANSA groups to be persuaded by the threat
of sanctions. In any case, the potential for expanding success due to a
yet-unproven method would be worth investigating sanctions. If
ANSAs prove to be non-compliant, then it may be beneficial to have
that lead to “the enforcement of targeted sanctions through states.”234

231.
232.
233.
234.
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Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 450–51.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 460.
Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 616.
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Geneva Call currently has a mild sanctioning policy in place. 235 If
ANSA signatories do not comply, they “agree to cease violations
immediately and to initiate appropriate investigations and sanctions in
accordance with international standards.” 236 If that does occur, then the
only sanction that Geneva Call does potentially foresee is to possibly
“publicize non-compliance in case of confirmed violations,” 237 which
could happen through law enforcement at a national or perhaps even
international level. 238 However, this could be built upon by enforcing
graver sanctions. For example, “for recalcitrant [ANSAs] harsher but
‘smart’ sanctions—travel bans, arms embargoes, the freezing of assets—
may perhaps have to be contemplated.” 239
This “fear of prosecution could constitute an incentive for ANSA
leaders and commanders to ensure that their practices are in
conformity with international norms, therefore easing the work of an
organisation willing to engage them.” 240 If sanctions do incentivize
ANSAs to comply with international norms and to become signatories
to a Deed, then perhaps it would be worth investigating sanctions as
a real possibility. Using sanctions rather than MRMs as a stick is more
likely to compel ANSA groups to comply with their commitment to
international norms, particularly if the sanctions are tailored
specifically to their wants and needs.
3. Political pressure, and naming and shaming
Another possible stick would be reducing the freedom of ANSAs—
forcing political pressure on them if they do not abide by signed Deeds
of Commitment. Hofmann and Schneckener suggested implementing
this pressure by putting ANSAs under “strict surveillance (by using
police and intelligence measures).” 241 They continued by pointing out
that ANSAs themselves “by and large remain dependent on other
actors, such as international organizations and states, to provide the

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Somer, supra note 53, at 119.
Id.
Bongard & Somer, supra note 132, at 688.
Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 608.
Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 459.
Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 11.
Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 609.
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required resources and political pressure” 242 for them to function.
Assuming that is the case, it could be very debilitating to ANSAs to have
those resources and political pressure apply negatively.
Similarly, one of the most obvious sticks used to enforce
compliance is naming and shaming. This is akin to putting political
pressure on ANSAs, because it “organize[s] social pressure and . . .
campaign[s] publicly, at the national and the international level,
against certain practices of non-state armed actors in order to harm
their legitimacy.” 243 This stick option might prove too commonplace,
especially for ANSAs who likely already feel political pressure and
naming and shaming, to effectively motivate compliance with a Deed
of Commitment.
4. Delegitimization
Deligitimizing ANSAs could also be particularly potent as a stick.
The process of delegitimization generally destroys the authority of a
group. 244 For groups such as ANSAs, who are likely looking to gain
political recognition, this could be extremely detrimental, and thus
might prove to be very effective in enforcing compliance with a Deed
of Commitment. The proper balance of delegitimizing while still
engaging these groups might be hard to find, however, because at this
point it is possible that ANSAs do not have much legitimacy in the
eyes of states anyway. Delegitimization would not be much of a threat
if ANSAs feel that they don’t have anything to lose. However, using
child soldiers might push the legitimacy level of an ANSA group so far
in a negative direction that it would be an effective method of
enforcement. If ANSAs prioritize becoming legitimate in order to
realize their aims, then delegitimization could be a heavy threat, 245 and
thus could be a very good option for a stick in terms of Deed of
Commitment compliance.

242. Id. at 619.
243. Id. at 612.
244. Definition of Delegitimize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/delegitimize (last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
245. Hart, supra note 10, at 222 (stating that “[f]or the United States and its allies, the
issue of child recruitment may be invoked to delegitimize state or non-state actors that are
construed as enemies in the post-9/11 War on Terrorism”).
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5. Political isolation
One final stick is to marginalize and politically isolate ANSAs even
further than they already are in order to reduce their “political and
ideological influence.” 246 Essentially, this idea would be to “marginalize
their worldviews and demands in public discourse and to isolate them—
politically as well as physically—from actual or potential followers and
their constituencies.” 247 If ANSA groups aim to gain political followers,
then political isolation would be extremely damaging to those goals.
This could be very effective in enforcing compliance with international
norms, and would likely be successful as a stick in enforcing compliance
with a Deed of Commitment.
For some ANSA groups, sticks might prove more threatening, and
thus more effective, than other carrot options. One or a combination
of the five stick options could be successful enforcement. These
options overall are likely more realistic than most carrot options,
although as mentioned, other than sanctions, Geneva Call has
historically gravitated toward carrots, rather than sticks. However,
here again it is worth noting that the highest possible likelihood of
successful compliance would be gained by a combination of sticks and
carrots. By utilizing both, the reach of and lasting compliance with the
Deeds of Commitment would encompass more ANSA groups who
might be motivated by a variety of methods. Engaging ANSAs and
continuing their compliance with Deeds of Commitment is crucial, as
it is the only viable way to convince ANSAs to stop using child soldiers.
C. Carrots
Despite the potential effectiveness of some stick methodology,
“[i]n some cases, [ANSAs] may be more willing to engage with a
carrot-based approach.” 248 They are not simply unbiased actors, but
rather engaged ones. As with any human actor, providing attractive
incentives will likely help ANSAs comply with Deeds of Commitment.
Carrots, as incentives, naturally appear more enticing than sticks. It is
possible that using only carrots would still gain the compliance of
many ANSA groups for that reason. The following are several options
of possible incentives.

246. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 609.
247. Id.
248. Somer, supra note 53, at 121.
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1. Ceasefires, negotiations, and peace agreements
There is a possibility that simple ceasefires, negotiations, peace
agreements, or some combination thereof will be attractive enough to
ANSAs to encourage Deed of Commitment compliance. 249 Hofmann
and Schneckener point out that “many non-state armed actors are
indeed driven by certain grievances and political demands, which can
be addressed through negotiations and/or other means.” 250 Even
negotiating with Geneva Call could be an avenue for ANSAs to
communicate better with state actors. Evidence of cooperation might
glean a favorable reaction from states as well. 251 It is also plausible that
better communication with state actors is a goal of ANSA groups,
especially if it would further their political or social aims. If that proves
true, then negotiations could be an attractive carrot. This option
would also be attractive to states, because they could likewise
communicate with ANSA groups, and further, their children would
then not be involved in armed conflict. However, these solutions are
technically already open options, and so the fact that many ANSAs
continue to use child soldiers probably indicates that this carrot would
not be powerful enough on its own to ensure Deed of
Commitment compliance.
2. Recognition of partial compliance
Partial compliance may be a good carrot in cases where it may not
be possible for ANSAs to comply with every aspect of a Deed of
Commitment. In fact, ANSAs simply may not know how to comply
with every component. 252 One Geneva Call scholar stated: “Although

249. See Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 610 (arguing that “ceasefires,
confidence-building measures, and peace agreements, as well as mechanisms for conflict
settlement and arbitration” could prove effective).
250. Id. at 611; see also id. at 617 (“A coalition of states may act as a ‘group of friends’ or
‘contact group’, [sic] engaging in conflict management and conflict mediation in
specific cases.”).
251. There would be no guarantee that cooperation would gain the approval of states. For
example, even in regard to Geneva Call’s negotiations and trainings with ANSAs within state
boundaries, “[s]ometimes governments are favorable, at times reluctant and very few [even] refuse
access.” GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20.
252. Katharine Fortin, Geneva Call Report: Perceptions of Armed Non-State Actors on
Humanitarian Action, ARMED GROUPS AND INT’L LAW (May 24, 2016),
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the ANSAs consulted express support for [International Humanitarian
Law], their comprehension of relevant rules on humanitarian access is
limited.” 253 In any situation, there will be a learning curve for the
ANSA group as they begin to change their practices to comply. As a
result, compliance is virtually impossible as an overnight goal, and
ANSAs will need time to implement the ideals to which they agreed
by becoming a signatory.
Eric Jensen suggested a system of recognizing partial compliance.
He remarked, “intermediate levels of recognition for partial
compliance” can prove useful in that they “provide incentives . . . to
comply with international law without eroding the maximum benefits
offered to those who comply with all requirements.” 254 Rather than
incentivizing only complete compliance, it might be beneficial to lower
compliance requirements, or at least allow time for the behavioral
changes to take place. However, the international community may be
wary of the possibility of lessening the incentive for complete
compliance. 255 If the ANSA groups do not sign right away, “rather
than opting for an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach, Geneva Call maintains
dialogue with such groups,” 256 and a lower or partial recognition of
compliance could result in more signatories. In addition, if ANSAs
were willing to completely comply with rules regarding child soldiers,
even if they are not completely complying with all the law of armed
conflict rules, then perhaps they could get partial benefits from the
law of war. This carrot option might be effective in terms of initially
engaging ANSAs, but would not be a long-term solution to
compliance, because it would allow for partial cooperation, which
might never turn into full cooperation with a Deed of Commitment.
The ultimate goal should be to completely abide by international
humanitarian norms regarding child soldiers.

https://armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2016/05/24/geneva-call-report-perceptions-ofarmed-non-state-actors-on-humanitarian-action/.
253. Id.
254. Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It is Time for Intermediate Levels of Recognition
for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 209, 213–14 (2006).
255. Id. at 229.
256. Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 11.
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3. Economic bribery
Economic bribery, while an appealing incentive to virtually
anyone, can be both bad and good as a carrot. Money can be a
powerful motivator, especially for groups such as ANSAs that lack
resources. Essentially, “if one is able to put enough pressure on them
and/or offer them some profits, these people will ultimately
comply.” 257 However, the danger would arise if these groups used the
funds for negative purposes, or simply took the money without fully
committing to comply. Some sort of safety measure could be put in
place to prevent those effects, such as a tracking or reporting method
for the money. That might not be effective, however, because if the
money were used but not reported, then it would be difficult to track.
Similarly, but perhaps more effectively, another form of economic
bribery could be to deposit the money into an escrow for post-conflict
resources. Money could be released if an ANSA proved its compliance
with the Deed of Commitment. It would likely not be beneficial to
have a fund like this run by the state, since that could be another
source of tension between the ANSAs and the states. Instead, Geneva
Call, or a different reliable third party, could govern the fund, and
money could be fairly distributed through them. The administering
party would be restricted to releasing the funds only upon certain
contractually-determined events. The idea of economic bribery makes
a good carrot, but the practical application is more difficult—where
would the money come from? That complication makes this carrot less
enticing as an incentive for Deed of Commitment compliance.
4. Social and community bribery
Bribery as a carrot can also be effective in a social and community
form. At this point, most ANSAs, if not all, “have some sort of
constituency or derive support from the communities where they
originate.” 258 Indeed, many ANSAs indicated that children live with
their families in combatant communities that are a part of the
groups. 259 These groups are likely the primary provider of social
structure and community support. Because of this, one scholar has

257. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 610.
258. Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 11.
259. See generally, GENEVA CALL, supra note 1.
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said that “sensitisation of such . . . communities has proven
instrumental in bringing pressure on ANSAs, and consequently
bringing about positive change in their behaviour.” 260 Gaining the
support of the community to pressure the ANSA group to comply
might prove difficult, but would ultimately be pivotal. 261 In fact, it
might also be possible that the community is “supportive” in the same
way that some children “volunteer”—only due to the ANSAs threat
of force. In that case, it might be easier than expected to utilize the
community’s support to motivate ANSA groups, and might also be a
sort of rescue to those community members as well as to the child
soldiers. However, as with many actions that require support of the
community, the drawback of this carrot would be that it might be
difficult to gain enough support. This would certainly deter this
method of incentivizing compliance with a Deed of Commitment.
5. Immunity
Immunity in international court proceedings could also be a
carrot. If they should ever be prosecuted, ANSA groups could gain
immunity through compliance. Immunity is a powerful incentive, and
can be instrumental in bringing about complete compliance. 262 Partial
compliance, while a good step, “does not merit complete privilege,”263
and so as a general rule, immunity should not be granted as a complete
benefit to ANSAs who only partially comply. 264 If ANSAs are
concerned that signing a Deed of Commitment would result in
prosecution for not previously abiding by international norms, then
this option could be appealing as an incentive. Offering immunity
would require extensive coordination with domestic governments and
the international community, though, so it may not be feasible
without a considerable amount of work. The extensive political
coordination needed to arrange immunity would likely be reserved for
very large ANSAs. Alternatively, because there are so many discrete
260. Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 11.
261. One challenge to gaining support would be if the community had antagonistic views
toward ANSAs, and would just as soon outcast those groups as help with their compliance.
Another difficulty might be that the community would simply prefer to watch passively rather
than make an effort to act, which would not provide any positive community motivation for the
ANSAs to comply. Antagonism and indifference could both be very detrimental.
262. Jensen, supra note 254, at 234.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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ANSAs, the transaction costs of arranging immunity for such small
groups may ultimately be prohibitive. This would be a carrot that
would be very effective for some groups, but hardly effective for others
in considering Deed of Commitment compliance.
6. Amnesty
Similar to the idea of immunity is the possibility of amnesty. Where
immunity would allow the ANSAs to be insusceptible to prosecution,
amnesty would grant a pardon. Some scholars have remarked that
“tools for reconciliation processes and transitional justice . . . may be
linked with amnesty provisions for leaders and members of armed
groups if they participate in the investigation of war crimes and human
rights violations, regret their past actions believably, and want to
change their behaviour.” 265 Although amnesty might contradict
demands for justice, it also may “serve as an incentive to end violence
and to refrain from using violence in the future.” 266 It can be difficult
for child soldiers to see their former leaders on trial because of lasting
emotional and psychological effects of their involvement with the
ANSA group, and thus their freedom from being forced to participate
in armed conflict could justify using amnesty as a carrot. Although this
carrot sounds ideal in helping to increase compliance with Deeds of
Commitment, it might be more difficult in actual application if states
were reluctant to grant it.
7. Self-monitoring privileges
Another potentially effective carrot to incentivize Deed of
Commitment compliance would be to offer ANSAs the privilege of
monitoring themselves. Since one major concern for ANSAs is privacy
and avoiding a breach of trust, 267 incentivizing compliance by offering
ANSAs the privilege of monitoring themselves may be an attractive
option. Indeed, “[w]hile no one should be naïve enough to accept

265. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 613.
266. Id.
267. Lacroix et al., supra note 129, at 11–12 (“[I]t may be that ANSAs would be less likely
to accept dialogue, or to negotiate in good faith with such an organisation, fearing that they
might share the information obtained (either voluntarily or following a summons by the court
or tribunal), which could then be used to take action against members of the ANSA or the
ANSA itself.”).
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that self-monitoring would be adequate on its own, its virtues should
not be ignored.” 268 One scholar remarked, “[Self-monitoring] can
strengthen a sense of ownership towards the implementation
process—[which is] especially important for ANSAs, who generally are
excluded from formation of norms—and the process of self-critical
reflection, including the sharing of good practice, can result in new
measures to improve compliance with substantive obligations.”269
Raising international expectations of ANSAs by treating them as
groups capable of monitoring themselves could be a good option.
ANSAs groups would likely find self-monitoring attractive due to the
appeal of privacy and the opportunity to act autonomously. However,
one potential problem with this is that ANSA groups may give false
reports, which might deter the international community from being
inclined to use this option. Ultimately, however, self-monitoring
should be an attractive idea—if the international community cannot
trust ANSAs to comply with a unilateral statement such as a Deed of
Commitment, how can it expect ANSAs to take the next, and much
larger step, of abiding by international humanitarian norms? Selfmonitoring as a means of incentivizing compliance is an option
worth exploring.
8. Training through Geneva Call
To remedy the potential problem that ANSAs simply do not know
how to comply, and also as a possible carrot, NGOs such as Geneva
Call could offer training to these groups. 270 Because “[a]rmed actors
will undergo processes of collective learning, which will alter strategies
and, eventually, their self-conception,” 271 it is important to provide
ways for them to successfully rebuild their groups. If Geneva Call
could provide a framework for ANSAs to “accept basic norms and
critically reflect their self-image and their actions,” which could be
done through encompassing “empathy for victims, the confession of
guilt, and public remorse,” then this carrot could be a very effective
method of compliance. 272 Moreover, Geneva Call’s success in

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Somer, supra note 53, at 119.
Id.
See Bongard & Somer, supra note 73, at 686.
Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 612.
Id. at 613.
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engaging 273 and commitment to training ANSAs already 274 point
toward the success of this carrot in initially engaging them.
9. NGOs as mediators
Further, NGOs could not only provide training, but could act as
a vehicle for ANSAs to prove their compliance. The use of NGOs as
mediators could be an attractive carrot for increasing Deed of
Commitment compliance. For example, ANSAs could piggy-back on
the good reputation of Geneva Call, making Geneva Call a placeholder
or mediator in the international community. One of the biggest
sources of leverage for NGOs such as Geneva Call is their influence on
local and international public opinion. 275 Because of their ability to
affect public opinion, Geneva Call could help ANSAs establish an
improved international reputation.
Generally, “ANSAs often lack the necessary resources, capacity and
equipment to implement their obligations under the [Deeds of
Commitment].” 276 Geneva Call, on the other hand, has a strong
international reputation. It is already in a good position to act as a
mediator, could educate external actors on how to best comply, and,
in turn, could educate the states about non-state armed actors. This
could be a good incentive for ANSAs to work with Geneva Call and
agree to a Deed of Commitment. Using Geneva Call as a mediator
would necessitate that Geneva Call keep a virtually flawless reputation.
However, because helping child soldiers is one of its aims, it would
presumably be keeping a good reputation in the eyes of the
international community already in order to further that goal, 277 and
would also likely be eager to help by acting as a mediator. This carrot
could be fairly easy to implement, which would make it an effective
way to increase compliance with Deeds of Commitment.
273. See supra Section V.B.
274. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20.
275. See Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 619.
276. Lacroix et al., supra note 129, at 11.
277. Geneva Call’s clean reputation is evidenced by the way that they operate as an
organization. They operate in a way that gains the trust of not only ANSA groups but also state
actors. For example, their attitude toward the governments on whose territory they are
interacting with ANSAs is one of transparency and communicating information. Governments,
particularly those of countries dealing with armed conflict, would not likely trust or allow access
to an organization with a negative reputation. The fact that very few governments refuse Geneva
Call access indicates the favorability of their reputation. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra
note 20.
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10. Increasing ANSA legitimacy
Signing the Deed of Commitment protecting children from
armed conflict would allow ANSAs to prove to the international
community that they can contribute in a humane and sophisticated
way to public international forums and abide by international
humanitarian norms. In other words, legitimizing ANSA groups could
be a very attractive carrot. Compliance would be an opportunity for
ANSA groups to build their own accountability in the international
community. The assumption that “non-state armed actors can be
affected by norms and arguments because many of them are
concerned with their public image . . . and their sources of
legitimacy” 278 supports the idea that this would be an effective
incentive. One scholar even suggested that a higher measure of success
can be obtained when “local populations,” or in this case ANSAs, “will
have to invest a great deal of themselves in this plan to prove their
worth before the rest of the world commits to them,” 279 because that
investment will bring good international returns. ANSAs, if nothing
else, surely would comply to gain legitimacy, since that often appears
to be a primary aim. 280 However, since states are so resolute in keeping
that aim from them, there is also the risk that this incentive might be
difficult to offer. Thus, this carrot would be somewhat effective for
enforcing compliance with Deeds of Commitment but might prove
difficult to implement.
11. Similar treatment to states
In the eyes of ANSAs, “legitimacy” could simply mean receiving the
same treatment as states. This could be an extremely effective carrot as
well. Though Somer stated that “[f]urther norms of customary
[International Humanitarian Law] require all parties to conflict to
provide children with the aid and care they require,”281 one potential
problem is that these norms are “convoluted and inconsistent . . .

278. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 613.
279. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 461.
280. See AOIFE MCCULLOUGH, THE LEGITIMACY OF STATES AND ARMED NON-STATE
ACTORS 2 (2015), http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Legitimacy.pdf
(stating that non-state actors seek to “gain legitimacy through a range of strategies”).
281. Somer, supra note 53, at 110.
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especially the way in which they treat ANSAs differently than states with
regard to use and recruitment.” 282
There is a basic idea that “non-state armed actors, and in particular
their respective leaderships, can be . . . slowly integrated into a
political setting, [perhaps] by distributing resources and sharing
political responsibility.” 283 This approach would “impl[y] a certain
degree of informal or formal power-sharing, be it at national or local
level, which would involve leaders of armed groups in day-to-day
politics.” 284 If reciprocity were guaranteed, ANSAs might be more
likely to abide by international norms. 285 To the credit of ANSAs,
“Geneva Call’s experience shows that there are indeed cases where
ANSAs commit to humanitarian norms without reciprocity by
states.” 286 Because ANSAs would prefer to have the same privileges as
states, but are willing to sign a Deed of Commitment even without
those privileges, offering this incentive could cause a significant
increase in signatories to the Deed. However, similar to the risks of
offering legitimacy, there is certainly a risk that domestic governments
and the international community would not be willing to extend this
as an incentive. Despite the potential positive effects regarding child
soldiers, states might fear that giving ANSAs too much political power
would cause of further political unrest and armed conflict. This carrot
might not be the most effective for encouraging compliance with a
Deed of Commitment.
12. Helping with law-making and rebuilding the state
Another carrot would be to allow ANSAs to help with lawmaking. Many of those fighting groups “do not participate in
international lawmaking because [it] is still the exclusive domain of
sovereign states.” 287 Many of the states in which ANSAs reside have
governments that are arguably corrupt or non-functional. 288 Assuming

282. Id.
283. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 611.
284. Id.
285. Lacroix et al., supra note 129, at 11.
286. Id.
287. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7.
288. See GENEVA CALL, Armed Non-State Actors, http://genevacall.org/how-wework/armed-non-state-actors/ (last visited Sep. 30, 2016).
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that those states would need to be rebuilt anyway, perhaps there would
be merit in letting ANSAs participate in the rebuilding and the
creation of norms.
As one scholar stated, “The concept is that the objects of
obligations should be the subjects of the norm-creation. As
international law traditionally addressed only States, it was justified
that only States were law-makers.” 289 At this point, “contemporary
international law increasingly obliges private actors[, which] would
call for participation of these actors in the norm-creation,” and
further, the law of armed conflict imposes obligations directly on
ANSAs, which would suggest that they should be involved in making
international laws, 290 or at least laws affecting them. Is it just to require
ANSAs to abide by rules in which they have no say? 291 Because of the
nature of sovereignty, however, the opportunity to participate in the
rebuilding of the state would likely need to be awarded by the state
itself, which could prove extremely difficult.
Even if ANSAs could not directly create laws, it could be enough
to simply award them an advisory role in international processes. 292 If
an ANSA desired such a role, it would need to abide by the Deed of
Commitment and humanitarian norms, because otherwise it would be
highly unlikely, perhaps impossible, that states would allow it to take
on an advisory role, much less participate in the actual law-making.
One scholar points out two advantages to this method of engaging
ANSAs in compliance: first, by allowing them to help make the laws,
they will be aware of the laws. “Knowledge,” he asserts, “remains a
factor of compliance.” 293 In addition, “giving [ANSAs] a voice in the
creation process can help produce rules better-tailored to the

289. Petrov, supra note 221, at 296.
290. Id.
291. Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener present the troubling dilemma: “On the
one hand, peace-building and state-building activities have to be implemented against the vested
interests of armed actors in order to achieve positive results in the long run.” They continued,
“On the other hand, progress regarding a secure environment is often only possible if at least
the most powerful of the non-state armed actors involved can be included in a political process
that grants them some kind of political influence (for example, posts in an interim government)
and/or economic and financial privileges, which may in turn undermine the whole process of
state-building.” Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 605.
292. Petrov, supra note 221, at 297.
293. Id. at 293, 299 (stating that being “part of the process, ensures awareness and
knowledge of existing rules”).

1037

5.HAFEN.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/28/2016 5:22 PM

2016

situation.” 294 He even argues that there seems to be support and a
“current trend” to involve these ANSA groups in “making . . .
international law with universal application.” 295 If enough community
support could be gleaned within these states, then perhaps there is a
possibility, however slight, that ANSAs could be recognized as groups
with political potential. That situation would introduce the possibility
of expanding their reach into rebuilding the state, as long as the
political body with the power to award those types of privileges were
willing to award law-making power to those groups.
Most states may see this as the riskiest of the carrot options. 296
Although it would surely incentivize ANSAs because it would offer
them both legitimacy and decision-making power, it may simply not
be feasible as a method of encouraging compliance with a Deed of
Commitment. Its feasibility would likely depend on the inclinations of
the states in unrest and whether they felt that the benefits of giving
ANSAs political influence would outweigh the risks. For example, one
risk is that the governments needing to be rebuilt are so unstable that
giving ANSAs political or law-making opportunities would simply
make a bad situation worse, because there would be no anchor
grounding and guiding the current government nor the new
ANSA body.
13. Honest concern for the children
Finally, although there are many other external incentives to
motivate ANSAs to abide by international humanitarian norms and
remove children from armed conflict, there is also the possibility that
ANSAs are internally motivated. Many factors may affect an ANSA’s
decision to “commit to humanitarian norms,” and one is simply

294. Id. at 299.
295. Id. at 297. But see Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 606 (At this point,
there is a question “whether it is possible to use these [armed non-state actors] as temporary
solutions and building blocks for reconstructing statehood, or whether this would simply
increase the risk of strengthening and legitimizing armed actors so that the establishment of the
state’s monopoly on the use of force becomes even less likely.” Further, “those actors who, in
theory, have the greatest potential for state-building and security governance are also the ones
who can mobilize the greatest spoiling power.”).
296. Giving power to groups known for their involvement in armed conflict might not be
a comfortable option for many states, particularly in states where armed conflict was the cause
of the political unrest and the consequent need to rebuild the state.
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“concern for the well-being of the affected population,” 297 especially
in regard to children. Ultimately, this is what motivates much of the
outside world, and although there often appears to be a disparity
between the goals of states and those of ANSAs, it would appear that
“[t]he protection of children from the effects of armed conflict can be
a rallying issue for all stakeholders, including [ANSAs] themselves.” 298
If this is true, then the internal motivation to protect children might
be enough for ANSAs to become signatories of the Deed of
Commitment once they realize that it aligns with their same ideals
regarding child soldiers. Unfortunately, the fact that ANSAs continue
to use children in their armies suggests that this might not be a likely
incentive. However, there is still the possibility that these groups care
for the children, as they suggest, and that improved communication
with the international community would show that they have made
greater strides than anticipated. Nonetheless, this carrot is
highly unlikely.
The preceding thirteen carrot options range from small and easily
attainable to highly idealist and large-scale. Like the sticks, the
effectiveness of each carrot would likely be unique to each situation.
Overall, Geneva Call appears to be more likely to use carrots than
sticks (other than perhaps small sanctions), and thus some of these
options could be attractive. Despite its tendency toward carrots, what
will likely be most successful in enforcing compliance with Deeds of
Commitment is to use a combination of sticks and carrots. Starting
with the smaller and more easily attainable stick and carrot options
would likely set a more attainable success threshold for ANSA
compliance than starting with some of the idealist large-scale ones.
Not only would the simpler sticks and carrots be easier for states to
acknowledge and allow, but starting small would also leave less room
for disaster resulting from failure. Further, starting with small-scale
options would give ANSAs room to discover and fix errors with their
compliance before implementing more substantial sticks and carrots
with higher stakes and more people involved. However, choosing one
particular stick or carrot option over another will still likely be
extremely situational.

297. Lacroix et al., supra note 129, at 11.
298. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 4.
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Having flexibility allows Geneva Call to mold incentives and
enforcements into whichever combination correlates best with the
situation. Engaging ANSAs to abide by international norms through
this Deed of Commitment is crucial, because “[i]f we fail to engage
armed non-State actors, we do so at the peril of affected children.” 299
Adjusting the combination of sticks and carrots to each unique
situation will likely maximize success.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the foreward to Geneva Call’s publication In Their Words,
Lieutenant-General the Honourable Roméo A. Dallaire, (Ret’d)
stated that “[s]ituations are rarely black and white . . . . Yet each party
to a conflict, State or non-State, has international obligations to
ensure the protection of children.” 300 He promoted the mindset that
“strategies targeting armed actors on child protection are not
contingent on the status of these actors, but rather on
their sincerity.” 301
Ultimately, although the community mentioned in the
introduction does not intentionally use children as soldiers, the reality
is that many children live in an ANSA community that is in the middle
of armed conflict. Further, these children, whether or not they
volunteer or are forced to act as soldiers by the leadership of their
social group, are involved in the warfare, no matter how indirectly.
Although there are some international treaties governing this area
of the law, most scholars agree that they are not binding on ANSAs,
or at least have little impact on the day-to-day operations of ANSAs
with respect to child soldiers. While Geneva Call’s Deed of
Commitment protecting children from armed conflict is not binding,
it still holds significant potential as a method for ANSAs to commit to
abide by international norms in a way that is analogous to a unilateral
statement. Based on the success of the Deed of Commitment banning
anti-personnel landmines, it would seem as though this Deed of

299. Id. It was also suggested that if the issue of child protection “particularly child soldiers,
[had been put] on the table during the negotiations in Rwanda, maybe there is a chance that the
outcome could have been mitigated,” which suggests that effectively using sticks and carrots
could have valuable and far-reaching effects. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
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Commitment, if executed in a similar fashion, would have
similar success.
The international community should find ways to encourage
compliance with the Deed of Commitment for the Protection of
Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict in order to eradicate the
use of child soldiers. Using sticks and carrots, and combining them in
ways to cater to specific and unique situations, can effectively
encourage ANSAs to become signatories to and abide by this Deed.
Complying with this Deed will increase the likelihood that those
actors will refrain from using or involving children in warfare. The
international community should investigate these different methods
of enforcement and incentives in order to foster a relationship of trust
between state and non-state actors, which would salvage the lives, and
the innocent youthful experiences, of these children.
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